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LEGAL ASSISTANCE

Petitioner had attempted to get legal representation from Utah Legal Service for
preparation of this brief. My source of income, possessions, savings, etc. were within the
financial guidelines of Utah Legal Services and would allow them to represent me free
gratis. But after looking at my IRA's they said I was ineligible. (0104-0105) When I
asked what it would cost to hire a lawyer, Mr. Dave Challed said, "Around $800 for the
brief and representation." To me, $800 is like $8,000 and the return on investment to
receiving unemployment benefits would not be reasonable. So I will try my best to
understand the legal guidelines to preparing my brief for the Court of Appeals and do
this, myself, without personal legal assistance.

EXPLANATION OF PREVIOUS NUMBERING SYSTEM
My original Docketing Statement included all the important dates and documents
available up to then. The Department of Employment Security Petition for Review also
listed these same documents and numbered them from 0001 to 0100. Thus for simplicity,
and avoidance of repetition, I'll also refer thoughout my own brief to these same
numbers, 0001-0100 found in this other document. In addition, the new document
information introduced within my brief, starts on Pages 0101-0123, these numbers are
correlated within the

a i l A W ^ ^ " of my brief.
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PETITIONER COUNTER POINTS
TO ANSWER AND CERTIFICATION OF RECORD,

As I considered the respondents five points in the "Answer and Certification of Record",
document by Department of Employment Security, I have tried to address, list, and
separate them with a number system throughout my brief. As the "Answer and
Certification of Record" is found in my

rcdJ^uAa^H^

as numbers (0112 and 0113),

anytime the reader sees these numbers in the text can realize that I am drawing counter
point examples for examination. Note: Item #3 will not be rebutted. The $931.
overpayment is not an issue with me, it is fair if the Court of Appeals sides with the
Department of Employment Security.

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION

This is an appeal of a final judgement from the Board of Review, the Industrial
Commission of Utah, Unemployment Compensation Appeal, Case No. 92-A-7286,
Decision, Case No. 92-BR-486. This appeal is concerning the Department of
Employment Security deniel of my receiving Unemployment benefits.

2

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. BOARD OF REVIEW'S SPECIAL IMPLIED GRANT OF DISCRETION
Being a common individual using the courts, I am unaware of previous court cases that
tend to disallow the judgement of a lower case in favor of a higher case. The Board of
Review said "nor has it considered the new evidence provided by the employer on appeal
in making this decision to reverse the Administrative Judge's determination." (0073,
0112-#l,0113-#2,#4,#5) When the higher court has only the same evidence that the
lower court had, that being nothing new, how can it come up with an exact opposite
conclusion? I feel that this is what had happened with the capricious decision making of
the Board of Review. How can the Board of Review be entitled to a deference pursuant
to a grant of discretion in this matter? I don't understand this lack of predictable
pattern of law. Due to fairness to those participating in the previous trial, higher courts
shouldn't take liberty to overshadow the competent judgement of the Administrative Law
Judge or of one of it's own Board of Review members when there isn't new evidence
with which to judge from. (0073, 0112-#l,0113-#4,#5)

The Administrative Law Judge quoted in her decision that "In this case, the claimant quit
work...the claimant is not disqualified from the receipt of benefits"(0051) and within the
ranks of the Board of Review there appeared an abstaining vote. The third Board of
Review member affirms the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, Hon. Reanna K.
Sloniger:

3

ff

In my opinion, the claimant met his burden to prove that his work situation with the

employer was untenable and "sufficiently adverse to a reasonable person1 to outweigh
the benefits of remaining employed." His supervisor's constant eruptive irritation with
the claimant, coupled with the claimant's diabetes and his fruitless efforts to persuade
the company president to control Wen Winegar's angry outbursts constituted good
cause2 for quitting. I would, therefore, affirm the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge.
/ S / Connie Neilson (0075)

I wish to know why the conclusions appeared to vacillate so widely between judiciary
constituents; Judge Sloniger and Connie Neilson for employment benefits, Mr. Carlson
and Mr. Hanover against. I wonder if the background viewpoints of the Board of
Review members had any bearing in their attitudes in this case. Which factions of the
community do each represent? Were some more pro management (employer) and
another more pro labor (employee), thus affecting their decision making? (0112-#1)

2. SOCIAL COSTS STATUTE3
As I sought a solution as if it was possible to defuse placing fault on the employer or the

1

R562-5A-2.
claimant.

Good Cause, 1 a. Adverse effect on the

2

R562-5A-5 Evidence and Burden of Proof.
cause" for quitting..."
3

"

he had "good

35-4-7.4 Social Costs—Relief or Charges. 1 (g) "Any
benefit costs..."

4

employee, I called Mr. Devine of Job Service and poised that question. He mentioned
the issue of "Social Costs". Upon further inquiry, Emma Thomas, Attorney for
Respondent gave to me the 35-4-7.4 "Social Cost - Relief of Charges" statute. As in
section 1(g), could Utah Pump/Mike Mortensen fit this case definition? "Any benefit
costs that are not charged to an employer and are not defined in this subsection are also
social costs." (0102-0103) Due to the existent former employer/employee friendships,
(0003, 0015) issues of quit VS compelled pressure to quit (the reasons why), issues of
family business VS rights of the individual employee...how did two of the three Board of
Review members be so absolutely decisive when it "concludes that it would not be
against equity and good conscience to deny unemployment insurance benefits in this
matter".(0074) Does this case have to unreasonably be stamped right/wrong,
accepted/denied like Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover averred, and due to their split vote
with Connie Neilson, arbitrarily sway the balance? (0112-#l,0113-#2,#5) Could the
Social Costs statute4 apply here?

3. AGAINST EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE, FACTS OF LAW
In reversing the Administrative Law Judge, Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover said:
"In reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the Board of Review notes
that in quit cases it is the claimant who has the burden to prove that he or she had good

4

35-4-7-4 Social Costs—Relief or charges• 1 (g) "Any
benefit costs..."
5

cause to quit5 or that it would be against equity and good conscience to deny
unemployment insurance benefits. The Board of Review finds that the claimant in this
case quit precipitously when Mr. Winegar lost his temper with the claimant because of
the way he took a telephone message. While Mr. Winegar's repeated bursts of irritation
with the claimant are not condoned by the Board of Review, the Board notes that in
order to establish good cause for quitting a claimant must establish that:
"The separation [was] motivated by circumstances which made continuance of the
employment a hardship or matter of real concern sufficiently adverse for a reasonable
person6 to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. There must be a showing of
actual or potential, physical, mental, economic, personal or professional harm caused or
aggravated by continuance in the employment. The claimants reasons for belief of the
consequences of remaining on the job must be real, not imaginary; substantial, not
trifling. The circumstances must be applied to the average individual, not the
supersensitive. [Utah Administrative Code R562-5a-2 (1992).] (0073)
"Though the claimant described to the Administrative Law Judge a work situation that
was unpleasant to him and also described some physical and emotional difficulties due
to his diabetes, he had worked with these job conditions for some time. The Board of
Review finds that immediate severance of the employment situation was, therefore, not
required by the claimant. The Board of Review concludes that circumstances on the
job, while admittedly not ideal, simply were not so compelling that the claimant had to
5

R562-5A-5 Evidence and Burden of Proof•
cause" for quitting..."
6

"...he had "good

R562-5a-2. Good Cause, 1 a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant.
6

quit without first obtaining alternate employment."

"Furthermore, since the Board of Review finds that the claimant's act of quitting
precipitously without first obtaining alternative employment was unreasonable, it
concludes that it would not be against equity and good conscience7 to deny
unemployment insurance benefits in this matter."(0073-0074)

4. STRESSFUL WORKING CONDITIONS
I wish to address these Board of Review findings and to exemplify my points of view
through former testimony and documents. On July 16, 1992 in the "Claimant Statement
of Voluntary Quit", I stated, "Our personalities have, at times, clashed with each other
and have caused each of us anxiety and resulted in yelling at each other...we were both
at the end of our rope and could see that it was not a happy situation, seeing how his
needs and the reality of my ability range to work like this were incompatible." (0003,
0113-#2) I wrote an appeal letter to the Department of Employment Security, received
on Aug. 21, 1992 in which I said, "...There had been several argument yelling matches
over the months that decimated myself to the point where I did make much effort to
seek other employment...All during this time I was working for Mr. Winegar, doing what
he asked, giving great attention to helping him in all the areas that he needed from me,
as an office manager. I had to put up with rudeness, being blamed for not doing things
that were never assigned to me (ambiguity on the Bosses part), told I was forgetful, yet

7

R562-5a-2 Good Cause. 1 a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant

7

upon bringing facts to light, I was yelled at and blamed. I, upon drawing attention to my
feelings and observations of my treatment delivered from certain related [relative]
employees, I was told to back off. I can quote instances in which I had to "back off1
with hurt feelings, biting my tongue to prevent further harsh words, or have full blown
yelling matches. I have worked in a taunting atmosphere where my self respect was
never considered and reduced to where I had to lash back with a loud "I quit"... (0113#2)

"I have listened and been hurt when I heard my employer tell another employee, my
equal, of things that he was critical. The incident was held in me for a long time, later
to be said, in which I was apologized to. (0113-#2)
"Working in a family business had some bad advantages...Many things are implied and
gets blamed of on the office manager if they are not done..." (0012-0014, 0113-#2)

5. PRESSURE VS ASK FOR JOB BACK
And of the animosity that contributed to me saying "I quit", Judge Sloniger asked and I
answered her question:
Judge: Alright, did you decide, I mean did you in that week plus the couple of days you
had, did you think maybe you should not have quit and asked for your job back?
Claimant: I actually did state something to that affect.
Judge: To Whom.
Claimant: To Wen

8

Judge: Wen? After that?
Claimant: Something in that period it was stated something to that affect you know that
well I've got to get my words real careful here because I really, I had come close to the
end of my rope as he was willing to let me quit. I didn't know whether I wanted to
continue under the pressure (0113-#2) because it seemed to be quite unbearable to me.
The pressure meaning the animosity that I felt expressed towards me." (0036. 0113-#2)

6. EG&G - ACCOUNTS PAYABLE INCIDENT
Another incident referred to Judge Sloniger showed tension within the office and
resulted in me quitting earlier:
Claimant: I had a bill that had been in my accounts payable for months, and I went back
to see from former checks whether we had paid it, and the check indicated a check had
gone out maybe nine months previous to that time for EG&G [note: I'm not sure it was
EG&G, it might have been Ingersol/Rand, or Sealol]. Now they were not pressing us to
pay it. However, the bills did appear, and I went back to talk to Wen about it [I pursued
it not to hassle Wen] and he got really angry that we had not paid it. [At times we
didn't have money to pay all our creditors anyway. Sometimes, some of us, myself
included, helped out by loaning Wen money when it was really needed. A
"supersensitive individual," might be less bending and less willing to make loans if he
didn't already care about his employer and feel he should sometimes "roll up his sleeves"
and help. (0073) I still have $700 out from that time, as well as an issue of a week of
vacation pay coming from Utah Pump. (0037, 0063, 0108)] I've got to interject that I,

9

with my accounts payable systems monthly would give the accounts payable to Wen to
show what was owed and how many days, months, it was overdue and so he knows of the
businesses that needed to be paid.
Judge: In other words what you are saying is that he already knew about this because
you gave him monthly statements.
Claimant: All the time
Judge: Alright.
Claimant: I was giving him monthly statements.
Judge: So he got angry.
Claimant: Well he got angry thinking that we had paid that and why didn't you know
that. He got really ticked. (0113-#2) I got really ticked because I was bringing it to his
attention to help me with information of what he knew, and at that time I got angry. I
wanted to tell Mitch about it, and all the time, Mitch is so busy you try to take care of
things as best you can with his dad. I brought it to his attention, showed him, even made
a phone call, found out yes indeed this amount was still owed, and he later, like I said, I
found his kindness with how he apologized so I rescinded and decided not to quit. (0113#2)
Judge: Okay.
Claimant: Is this the time where I can tell you of incidents your Honor?
Judge: You can, but I don't need them.
Claimant: I'm trying to...
Judge: Did you quit, did you quit as the Department found to look for other work or

10

did you quit because you couldn't stand working with Wen and he created anxiety and
stress. (0113-#2) Why did you quit?
Claimant: I guess I need to, see the answer to that question...
Judge: No listen to me, listen to me, when you saidClaimant: It became so stressful that I left.
Judge: Yes and you said that. Here's what you said.
Claimant: I left because of that.
Judge: You said, "The anxiety and the pressure built up working with Wen, and I said, 'I
quit'" And you gave second thoughts but because of all of the incidents with Wen you
decided not to ask for your job back. That's what you've told me as the reason you quit.
Is that the reason you quit?
Claimant: That's the reason. The anxiety was overwhelming..." (0041-0042,0113-#2)

7. ANY REASONABLE PERSON
I feel that from the first series of documents filled out, the "Claimant Statement of
Voluntary Quit" (0002-0005, 0113-#2) on up to the trial where Judge Sloniger asked me
in detail and under oath, I have told of the anxiety that Mr. Winegar and I both worked
under. Why wasn't this clear enough for Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover? I had
established the fact that I had shown burden of proof that I had good cause to quit.8
Paraphrasing Connie Neilson, I also believe that any reasonable person9 would have
8

R562-5A-5 Evidence and Burden of Proof.
cause" for quitting..."
9

R562-5a-2 Good Cause. 1 a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant
11

"...he had "good

done the same as I had after outweighing the same benefits of remaining employed.
(0075, 0113-#2) I felt there was a showing of mental and professional harm caused by
continuance in the employment, and that I didn't imagine this happening nor was it
trifling. I claim I am not supersensitive, but am an average individual. (0073)

8. INELIGIBILITY (OR ELIGIBILITY) FOR BENEFITS, QUIT STATUTE 35-4-5
I wonder if Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover would have worked under the conditions that I
tarried under when they said, "Though the claimant described...a work situation that was
unpleasant to him...he had worked with these job conditions for some time." (0074, 0112#1, 0113-#2,#5) Unpleasant isn't the word, it was more like unbearable. Did they
think I should have quit before allowing such stressful conditions to happen? Why did
they imply that I had gotten used to this? Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover stated "he had
working under these conditions for some time. The Board of Review finds that
immediate severance of the employment situation was, therefore, not required by the
claimant. The Board of Review concludes that circumstances on the job, while
admittedly not ideal, [arbitrarily stated, 0112-#l,0113-#2,#5) simply were not so
compelling that the claimant had to quit without first obtaining alternative employment."
Would Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover have stayed under similar conditions? (0113-#2)
Did they think I gave up my rights by severancing my relationship with Utah Pump? If
so, it's not fair and their judgement should be overturned. The same law that protects
employers protects employees working under duress also. If duress is such that it
becomes unbearable that such employee has to quit his job, then, after a determination,

12

he would still receive benefits. In statute 35-4-5, "Ineligibility for Benefits. Quit" it states
"A Claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant leaves work under
conditions of such nature that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to
impose a disqualification."10 (0119) Though I had decided to stay under duress, or as
Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover averred "he had worked under these conditions for some
time" (0074) did not mean I forfeited my unemployment benefit rights when I did quit
and asked for them. I have presented evidence to show that the work environment was
unbearable, not just unpleasant. (0112-#1, 0113-#2,#5)

9. REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE EFFORT
The statute 35-4-5, "Eligibility for Benefits, Quit" says, "The commission shall, in
cooperation with the employer, consider...the reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the
labor market in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility is contrary to equity
and good conscience."11 (0119) I believe as Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover considered
"the reasonableness of the claimants actions", they capriciously concluded that though I
hadn't first obtained alternative employment before quitting, they didn't recognize that I
was trying. (0003, 0005, 0112-#1, 0113-#5) How many judicial seats are there when a
difficulty arises, so that a judge has a job to go to enabling such judge to leave the other
behind? To assume by Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover that I was not looking for another

10

35-4-5 Ineligibility for Benefits. Quit, (a) "A claimant shall not be denied..."

11

35-4-5 Ineligibility for Benefits. Quit, (a)"... genuine continuing attachment..."
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job while at Utah Pump was not correct, of not having another job to go to is correct.
My situation in finding a job, could be considered similar to finding a judgeship - not
many of them - and is just as real for me on my own level as a recreational therapist. I
had limited options available as a recreational therapist as I said to Judge Sloniger:
Claimant: ...The anxiety was overwhelming. I didn't have another job to go to. I
brought newspaper articles, not articles, but help wanted ads that shows a variety of days
showing that there's not a whole lot of recreation therapy jobs... (0113-#2,#5)
Judge: Why are you focusing on recreation therapy jobs?
Claimant: Because I'm licensed in that..." (0042)
Besides these statements made to Judge Sloniger, why wasn't my initial "Claimant
Statement of Voluntary Quit", dated July 16, 1992 enough to show that I was trying to
replace my current employment with that of the National Cart Company? (0112-#1,0113#2,#5) "From January on, I had been trying to get another job of washing and repairing
shopping carts from a former friend of mine, LeRoy Sampson. That person was trying to
renew his contract contacts with companies in the intermountain West...I had been
letting Mr. Winegar know of this effort and of my subsequent future quitting which Mr.
Winegar was patiently letting me work for him until I started the new job..." (0003 &
0005) Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover "against equity and good conscience" (0073) refused
to acknowledge this effort. (0112-#1, 0113-#2,#4,#5).
I wish to quote from the Docketing Statement to further elaborate my claim that I was
making efforts to prepare myself for future work while at Utah Pump, "I wish however, it
be known that the Winegars have tried to help me with my employment needs. First and

14

foremost, they gave me a job...I started working for Utah Pump in a new position to me,
Office Manager. It was also within this same letter that I also said I had received a
power stream sprayer from Wen in exchange for a debt I had with him. I needed a
sprayer pump, they gave me a good deal on one that hadn't sold for months. I had a
trailer in which Wen offered to trade a wire feed welder so that his son could use the
trailer to start another business. They were willing to give me time, information and
their help to prepare for the instance I would start working intra-state for National Cart
Company. I was disappointed that the job never materialized, the job that both Wen
and I thought would be excellent and would allow me to stop working for them. I was
looking for other work and Utah Pump was helping me." (0095-0096, 0112-#l,0113-#5)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

When the higher court has only the same evidence that the lower court had,
nothing new, why was the conclusion exactly the opposite? How can the Board of
Review be entitled to a deference pursuant to a grant in this matter? In what
statue is this expressly made or implied within? Why did the conclusions appear
to vacillate so widely between judiciary constituents? Does not the two of three
split in the voting members of the Board of Review impugn the idea of its
conclusion being done in equity and good conscience?

15

2.

Did the background of any member of the Board of Review individually
contribute to its decision making?

Could the "Social Costs" statute12, section 1(g), "and are not defined in this

3.

subsection are also Social Costs" be referred to in this case? Because the benefit
costs were not to be charged to the employer according to two of the Board of
Review members, why must they be charged to the employee? Was it possible for
the Board of Review, by using this subsection, to defuse placing fault on the
employer or the employee thus maintaining its equity and good conscience in its
conclusions?

4.

"While the circumstances on the job were admittedly", stated by the Board of
Review, "not ideal" and the "employers repeated bursts of irritation were", also,
"not condoned" (0073), how could its deciding members say that its decision
making was done in equity and good conscience?13 Doesn't these admissions
show that there was a contributory cause of unnecessary stress to the atmosphere
of this work environment?

5.

If such animosity was in existence to the Board of Review, why didn't it assume a
more prevalent part in their decision making? Was not this the claimant "burden

12
13

35-4-7.4 Social Costs-Relief or charges.
R562-5a-5 Good Cause. 1 a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant
16

to prove"?(0073) Why wasn't this viewed as "so compelling that the claimant had
to quit without first obtaining alternate employment"?(0074) I have presented
evidence to show that the work environment was unbearable, not just unpleasant.
Did they think I should have quit before allowing such stressful conditions to
happen? Why did they imply that I had gotten used to this? Because I had
worked under these conditions for some time, didn't forfeit my unemployment
benefit rights when I quit and asked for them. Was I expected to work under
these conditions without alternate unemployment rights by the Board of Review?
Would any reasonable person14 have done the same as I have done after
outweighing the same benefits of remaining employed?

6.

Why did the deciding Board of Review members refuse to acknowledge my efforts
to find employment through efforts with recreation therapy jobs (0042) or the
effort of buying, trading and collecting of equipment for the National Cart
Company?(0003, 0086) As the deciding Board of Review members considered
"the reasonableness of the claimants actions", they capriciously concluded that
though I hadn't first obtained alternative employment before quitting, they hadn't
acknowledged that I was trying.

14

R562-5A-2 Good Cause. 1 a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant
17

CONCLUSION
So in summary, I feel that a higher court (Board of Review), using only the same
information available to the lower court (Administrative Law Judge), should not be
allowed such discretionary liberties in this case. If such "implied" statue language does
exist as stated by Emma R. Thomas, Attorney for Department Security (0113-#4), it is
not known to me or to the general public. I just reason that common sense would not
allow such a conclusionary reversal as such would appear quite unreasonable, irrational,
arbitrary and capricious. (0112-#l,0113-#5) How does any employee have rights and is
supported upon a quit if not in this case? (0113-#2) Or does the employer's rights take
priority over the employee's rights? (0112-#2,#4) How much did the Board of Review
want me to take before they would say "enough"? (0112-#1) Why did not the Board of
Review recognize my actions to try to remain attached to the labor market? Was this
not "against equity and good conscience" to deny unemployment benefits"? (0073)
Dated this ^ Z ^ a y of May, 1993
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hearby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the Brief by depositing the
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Utah Pump and Motor Supply
c/o Mitch Winegar
1839 South 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Emma R. Thomas #4681
Attorney for Respondant
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of
Employment Security
40 East 300 South
P. O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Dated this ^ £ day of May, 1993
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to 0001 to 0100 of the Department of Employment Securities Petition
for Review of previously introduced documentation.
and repitition by doing this.

I hope to cut costs

35-4-7.4
35-4-7.4

S o c i a l c o s t s — Relief or c h a r g e s .

(1) Social costs shall consist of those benefit costs defined as follows:
(a) Benefit costs of an individual will not be charged to a base-period
employer, but will be considered social costs if the individual's separation
from that employer occurred under any of the following circumstances:
(i) the individual was discharged by the employer or voluntarily quit
employment with the employer for disqualifying reasons, but subsequently
requalified for benefits and actually received benefits;
(ii) the individual received benefits following a quit which was not
attributable to the employer; or
(iii) the individual received benefits following a discharge for nonperformance due to medical reasons.
(b) Social costs are benefit costs which are or have been charged to
employers who have terminated c o v e r a g e and are no longer liable for
contributions, less the amount of contributions paid by such employers
during the same time period.
(c) The difference between the benefit charges of all employers
whose benefit ratio e x c e e d s the maximum overall contribution
rate and the amount determined by multiplying the taxable payroll of the
same employers by the maximum overall contribution rate is a social cost.
(d) Benefit costs attributable to a concurrent base-period employer
will not be charged to that employer if the individual's customary hours of
work for that employer have not b e e n reduced.
(e) Benefit costs incurred during the course of c o m m i s s i o n approved training which occurs after December 31, 1985, will not be
charged to base-period employers.
(0 Benefit costs will not be charged to employers if such costs are
attributable to:
(i) the state's share of extended benefits;
(ii) uncollectible benefit overpayment;
(iii) the proportion of benefit costs of c o m b i n e d w a g e claims that
are chargeable to Utah employers and are insufficient when separately
considered for a monetary eligible claim under Utah law and which have
been transferred to a paying state; and
26
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35-4.7-4

(iv) benefit costs attributable to wages used in a previous benefit
year that are available for a second benefit year under Subsection 35-4-3 (b)
because of a change in method of computing base-periods, overlapping
base-periods, or for other reasons required by law.
(g) Any benefit costs that are not charged to an r uployer and
not defined in this subsection are also social costs.

Exclusion of Reimbursable Employers.
(2) Subsection (1) applies only to contributing employers and not to
employers which have elected to finance the payment of benefits in
accordance with Section 344-7.5 or 35-4-8.5.

35-4-7.45 Bonds t o Ensure Compliance.
(1) The commission, whenever it considers it necessary to ensure
compliance with this chapter, may require any employer, subject to the
contribution imposed hereunder, to deposit with it any bond or security as
the commission shall determine. The bond or security may be sold by the
commission at public sale, if it becomes necessary, in order to recover any
tax, interest, or penalty due. Notice of the sale may be served upon the
employer who deposited the securities personally or by mail. If by mail,
notice sent to the last-known address as the same appears in the records of
the commission is sufficient for purposes of this requirement. Upon the sale,
the surplus, if any, above the amounts due, shall be returned to the
employer who deposited the security.
(2)(a) If an employer fails to comply with Subsection (1), the district
court of the county in which the employer resides or in which he employs
workers shall, upon the commencement of a suit by the commission for that
purpose, enjoin the employer from further employing workers in this state
or continuing in business until the employer has complied with Subsection
(1).
(b) Upon filing of a suit for such purpose by the commission, the court
shall set a date for hearing and cause notice to be served upon the employer.
The hearing shall be not less than five nor more than 15 days from the
service of the notice.

35-4-7.5 Nonprofit Organizations.
Financing of Benefits.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter for payments
by employers, benefits paid to employees of nonprofit organizations,
27
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES,

INC.
124 SOUTH 400 EAST • 4TH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
(801) 328-8891

WATS 1-800-662-4245
April 20,

1993

Michael J. Mortensen
8001 South 1300 West
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Dear Mr. Mortensen:
I have reviewed your request for assistance from Utah Legal
Services with Dave Challed, and I agree with his determination that
your IRA account is an asset which must be considered to determine
whether you are financially eligible for services. I understand
that you would face a penalty for withdrawing funds from your IRA
account, but despite the penalty it is an asset which is available
to you which we cannot overlook.
Attached are the regulations which charge our Board with
setting asset ceilings (§1611.6) and a copy of the asset guidelines
they have adopted. Also attached is the grievance procedure, your
next step would be to appeal this determination to Brian Barnard
because Waine Riches and I have reviewed the matter and agree with
Dave's analysis.
We wish you good luck pursuing your claim for
unemployment benefits.
Sincerely,

Anne Milne
Director
0104
enclosures

maximum income level on the basis of
factors listed in § 1611.5(b)(1), the factors listed in § 1611.5(b)(2) shall also
be used before reaching a final determination.
(B) If a recipient tentatively determines not to serve a client under the
maximum income level on the basis of
factors listed in § 1611.5(b)(2), the factors listed in § 1611.5(b)(1) must also
be used before reaching a final determination.
(c) A recipient may provide legal assistance to a group, corporation, or association if it is primarily composed of
persons eligible for legal assistance
under the Act and if it provides information showing that it lacks, and has
no practical means of obtaining, funds
to retain private counsel.

(e) Thg governing body may establish authority for the project director
to waive tne ceilings on mlnimu^gTlowable assets in unusual or extremely
meritoriouF situations, in the event
that a waiver is granted, that decision
shall be documented and incluc d in
the client's file. The recipient ,hail
keep such other records as will p vide
information to the Corporatior is to
the number of clients so serv
and
the factual basis for the de .sions
made.
§ 1611.7 Manner of determining eligibility.

(a) A recipient shall adopt a simple
form and procedure to obtain information to determine eligibility in a
manner that promotes the development of trust between attorney and
§ 1611.6 Asset ceilings.
client. The form and procedure adopt(a) By January 30, 1984, and annual- ed shall be subject to approval by the
ly thereafter, the governing body of Corporation, and the information obthe recipient shall establish and trans- tained shall be preserved, in a manner
mit to the Corporation guidelines in- that protects the identity of the client,
corporating specific and reasonable for audit by the Corporation.
asset ceilings, including both liquid
(b) If there is substantial reason to
andjipn-liquid a s s e ^ T o be utilized in" doubt the accuracy of the information,
"BHermining eligfbmTy for services? a recipient shall make appropriate inThe guideTffres shall* consider m e econ- quiry to verify it, in a manner consistomy of the service area and the rela- ent with an attorney-client relationtive cost-of-living of low-income per- ship.
sons so as to ensure the availability of
(c) Information furnished to a recipservices to those in the greatest eco- ient by a client to establish financial
nomic and legal need.
eligibility shall not be disclosed to any
(b) The guidelines shall be consist- person who is not employed by the reent with the recipient's priorities es- cipient in a manner that permits identablished in accordance with 45 CFR tification of the client, without ex1620 and special consideration shall be press written consent of the client,
given to the legal needs of the elderly, except that the recipient shall provide
institutionalized, and handicapped.
such information to the Corporation
(c) Assets considered shall include when:
all liquid and non-liquid assets of all
(1) The Corporation is investigating
persons who are resld^nrniembers of a allegations
that question the financial
family unit, except that a recipient eligibility of
previously identified
may exclude the principal residence of client and thea recipient's
representaa client. T h e guideline* sha.11 ta.kp intn
tion
thereof;
account impediments to an individ(2) The information sought by the
ual's access to £gg£ts oi the family_unit
Corporation relates solely to the fior nousenoiq.
(d) Reasonable equity value in work- nancial eligibility of that particular
related equipment which is essential client;
(3) The information sought by the
to the employment or self-employCorporation
is necessary to confirm or
ment of an applicant or member of a
deny
specific
allegations relating to
family unit, shall not be utilized to disqualify an applicant, provided that the that particular client's financial eligiowner is attempting to produce income bility and the recipient's representation thereof; and
consistent with its fair market value.
0105
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL J. MDRTENSEN
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Respondent.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Record of Petition for Review to the Utah Court of Appeals
from the Industrial Caranission of Utah
Department of Employment Security

Appearances:
Michael J. Mortensen
Petitioner, Pro se
8001 South 1300 West
West Jorxian, Utah 84088
Emma R. Thomas #4681
Attorney for Respondent
Industrial Commission of Utah
Departanent of Employment Security
140 East 300 South
P. O. Box 11600
Salt lake City, Utah 84147

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL J. MORTENSEN,
Petitioner,
v.
CEKTIFICATE
DEPARIMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Case No. 930093-CA
Respondent.

I hereby certify that I am the duly appointed, qualified Secretary to
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah; that as such
Secretary, I hereby certify that the following documents, numbered
0001 to 0100 inclusive, and designated as:
Page(s)
Claim for Unemployment Benefits, Form 601, dated
July 17, 1992, effective July 12, 1992, for the
claimant, Mike Mortensen (Exhibit 6)

0001

Claimant Statement of Voluntary Quit, Form 680-Q1,
dated July 16, 1992, for the claimant, Mike
Mortensen (Exhibit 4)

0002-0005

Eligibility
Certification,
July 17, 1992 (Exhibit 5)

0006-0007

Form

653-C, dated

Record of Weekly Job Search Efforts (Exhibit 8)

0008

Employer Notice of Claim Filed, Form 606, dated
July 28, 1992, unsigned, received by the Department on July 29, 1992 (Exhibit 3)

0009

Decision of Eligibility For Unemployment Insurance
Benefits, Form
615-J, dated
August 12, 1992
(Exhibit 2)

0010

0108

Page(s)
Appeal From Decision of Representative, Form 617,
received August 21, 1992, frcm the claimant, Mike
Mortensen (Exhibit 1)

0011-0014

Letter dated September 9, 1992, frcm Utah Punp and
Motor Supply Company, received September 23, 1992,
with attached letters of employees (Exhibits 7-A,
7-B, 7-C and 7-D)

0015-0019

Notice of Hearing, Form 743, dated September 16,
1992, advising the claimant, Mike Mortensen, and
the employer, Utah Punp & Motor Supply Co., of a
hearing scheduled for Thursday, September 24, 1992
at 9:00 AM (Exhibit C)

0020

Response Card, Form 725, frcm the claimant, Mike
Mortensen, indicating the claimant will attend the
hearing as scheduled (Exhibit D)

0021

Decision of Administrative Law Judge mailed September 24, 1992 (Exhibit B)

0022-0023

Appeal From Decision of Representative, Form 617,
frcm the claimant, Mite Mortensen, dated September 24,
1992, received
September 24,
1992
(Exhibit A)

0024

Notice of Hearing, Form 743, dated October 5,
1992, advising the claimant, Mike Mortensen, and
the employer, Utah Punp & Motor Supply Co., of a
hearing scheduled for Friday, October 16, 1992 at
8:30 AM

0025

Transcript of Hearing held October 16, 1992

0026-0047

Decision of Administrative Law Judge mailed November 13, 1992

0048-0053

Letter of Appeal to the Board of Review, addressed
to the Administrative Law Judge from the employer,
Utah Punp & Motor Supply Co., dated November 18,
1992, received November 20, 1992

0054-0055

0109

Letter dated November 27, 1992 from the Board of
Review to the employer, Utah Pump & Motor Supply
Company, acknowledging receipt of its appeal to
the Board of Review, with a copy to the claimant,
Mike Mortensen, allowing both parties 15 days in
which to submit written arguments or comments

0056

Letter inemorandum dated December 2, 1992, from the
employer, Utah Pump & Motor Supply Co., to the
Board of Review, in support of the employer's
appeal to the Board of Review

0057-0058

Letter memorandum dated December 11, 1992, from
the claimant, Mike Mortensen, to the Board of
Review in rebuttal to the employer's appeal to the
Board of Review, with attachments

0059-0069

1. Letter dated December 11, 1992

0059-0067

2.

3.

Letter dated July 15, 1992 from Quality Care
Murray concerning Mike Mortensen

0068

Letter dated October 14, 1992 from Dr. John
Houchins, Redwood Community Health, corK^erning
Mike Mortensen

0069

Letter dated December 28, 1992, from the Board of
Review to Utah Pump & Motor Supply Company, with a
copy to the claimant, Mike Mortensen, forwarding a
copy of the claimant's memorandum dated December 11, 1992, to the employer; forwarding a copy
of the employer's memorandum dated December 2,
1992 to the claimant

0070

Claimant Record Transcript dated December 31, 1992

0071

Decision of the Board of
1993

Review dated January 13,

Letter dated January 13, 1993 from the Board of
Review to the claimant, Mike Mortensen, submitting
the decision of the Board of Review

0072-0076

0077

Page(s)
Letter dated January 13, 1993 from the Board of
Review to Utah Pump & Motor Supply Company submitting the decision of the Board of Review

0078

Petition for Writ of Review filed with the Utah
Court of Appeals on February 12, 1993 by the
claimant, Michael J. Mortensen, received by the
Board of Review on February 17, 1993, with
attached letter of appeal dated February 12, 1993

0079-0086

1.

Petition for Writ of Review

0079

2.

Letter of appeal dated February 12, 1993

0080-0086

Writ of Review filed on February 12, 1993 by the
Utah Court of Appeals, received by the Board of
Review on February 17, 1993

0087

Docketing Statement filed by Michael J. Mortensen
on March 5, 1993, to the Utah Court of Appeals,
received by the Board of Review on March 6, 1993

0088-0099

Letter dated March 9, 1993 to the employer, Utah
Pump & Motor Supply Company, advising the employer
that the claimant, Michael J. Mortensen, has filed
a Petition with the Court of Appeals

0100

contain a full, true, and correct
as the same appears on file in the
of Utah, Department of Enployment
proceedings and all the evidence in

record of the above-entitled case
Office of the Industrial Commission
Security, the same being all the
the case.

Secretary 2/
Board of Review
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Enployment Security

Date: March 9, 1993
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EMMA R. THOMAS #4681
Attorney for Respondent
Board of Review of the Industrial
Qxnmission of Utah, Department of
Employment Security
140 East 300 South
P. O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL J. M0KTENSEN,
Petitioner,

:
:
ANSWER AND

v.

:

DEPARIMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,

:

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD
Case No. 930093-CA
Respondent.

:

TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE JUDGES THEREOF:

Respondent herein has hereby certified that the record of this
case as contained in Pages 0001 through 0100 of this certification does
constitute a true and correct record of all documents and transcript of
testimony and evidence taken in this matter together with the findings
of fact and decision.
Respondent answers the Petition of the Petitioner, Michael J.
Mortensen, and avers:
1.

The decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial

Commission of Utah is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record, and was not arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable.
0112

2.

The decision of the Board of Review, which reversed a prior

decision of an Administrative Law Judge, properly held that Petitioner
left work voluntarily without good cause and that it would not be
contrary to equity and good conscience to iirpose a disqualification
pursuant to Section 35-4-5 (a) of the Utah Employment Security Act.
3.

The decision of the Board of Review properly established an

overpayment in the amount of $931.00, pursuant to Section 35-4-6 (e) of
the Utah Employment Security Act.
4.

The decision of the Board of Review is entitled to deference

pursuant to a grant of discretion to the agency and the Board of
Review expressly made in the statute or implied from the language of
the statute.
5.

The Board of Review's conclusions are reasonable and rational

in respect to mixed questions of law and fact.
Dated this V

7

^

day of March, 1993.

Emma R. Thomas
Attorney for Respondent
Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah,
Department of Employment Security
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CERTIFICATE OF MAIU2JG

SERVED the foregoing Certification of Record by mailing a copy,
postage prepaid, to the following this y

day

of March, 1993.

Michael J. Mortensen
Petitioner, Pro se
8001 South 1300 West
West Jordan, UT 84088

<^^0-/^^^
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Judith M Billings
Picsidniii Judge

Utaf) Court of Appeals

Leonard H. Russon
\ssouate Piesiding Judge

Russell W Bench

230 South 500 East. Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Judiie

Regnal W. Gartt
Judge

Clerks' Office 801-578-3950
Administration 801-578-3900

Pamela T. Greenwood

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk ot the Court

Jud»c

Fax 801-578-3999

Norman H. Jackson
Judsie

May 4, 1993

Gregory K. Orme
Judge

Michael J. Mortensen
8001 South 1300 West
West Jordan, UT 84088
In Re:
Michael J. Mortensen,
Petitioner,
Case No. 930093-CA
Department of Employment Security,
Respondent.
Dear Mr. Mortensen:
Our records indicate that the appellant's brief in this case
was due April 22, 1993. To date, the brief has not been filed
and is therefore in default. Your brief and seven copies must be
received in this Court by May 12, 1993.
If the brief is not filed by May 12, 1993, the case may be
dismissed pursuant to R. 3(a), Utah R. App. P.
Sincerely,
^

Sheri Knighton
Deputy Clerk
cc:

Jan Graham
Attn: K. Allan Zabel
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL J. MORTENSEN,
Petitioner/Appellant,

STIPULATED MOTION FOR
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
TO FILE BRIEF

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
Respondents/Appellees.

Case No.

930093-CA

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Michael J. Mortensen, Pro se, who
requests pursuant to Rule 22, Utah R. App. P., for an enlargement
of time to file his Brief in the above-entitled matter for the
reason that he needs 30 days additional time to prepare and file
his Brief.
Appellant has not previously requested or been granted an
enlargement of time.
The original time that the Appellant's Brief is due is April
22, 1993.
Appellant seeks an enlargement of time to file his Brief until
May 22, 1993.
Respondent Department of Employment Security, by and through
its legal counsel, Emma R. Thomas, does not resist Appellant's
request and hereby stipulates to Appellant's request as stated
above.
DATED this 20th day of April, 1993. -

^_

^±H*2£^

BY:
EMMA R. THOMAS ^tC. 4
Department of Employment Security
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

MICHAEL 0\^ORTENSEN
8001 Soutn"1300 West
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Petitioner, Pro se
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Judith M. Billings
Piesidinii Judge

Utaf) Court of Appeals

Leonard H. Russon
\ssiKiaie Piesidinii Judge

Russell W. Bench

230 South 500 East. Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Judge

Regnal W. Garff
Judue

Clerks' Office 801-578-3950
Administration 801-578-3900

Pamela T. Greenwood

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk ot the Court

Judiie

Fax 801-578-3999

Norman H. Jackson
Judge

March 10, 1993

Gregory K. Orme
Judge"

Michael J. Mortensen
8001 South 1300 West
West Jordan, UT 84088
In Re:
Michael J. Mortensen,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 930093-CA
Department of Employment Security,
Respondent.
Dear Mr. Mortensen:
On March 10, 1993, the record index on this appeal was filed
in this court. The record remains on file with the trial court
for your use in preparing your brief. The purpose of this letter,
therefore, is to set the briefing schedule.
Pursuant to Rules 13 and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the appellant's brief must be served and filed on or
before April 22, 1993. This due date takes into consideration the
three days mailing provision of Rule 22(d). Briefs filed by use
of first class mail must be postmarked on or before April 22nd,
pursuant to Rule 21(a).
Please refer to the attached checklist and Rules 24, 26 and 27
for content and format requirements. These requirements are
strictly enforced. Before making duplicate copies of your
original brief, you may bring your original to the clerk's office
at the Court of Appeals for examination. This will ensure that
the brief is correct, and may save you time and expense.
Sincerely,

/
cc:

Janice Hill
Deputy Clerk

Jan Graham, State Attorney General
K. Allan Zabel, Special Assistant Attorney General
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35-4-5

Ineligibility for Benefits.

J

tylMW

An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a ^
waiting period:
(ft

Quit.
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without
good cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter
until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment
and earned wages for those services equal to at least six times the claimant's
weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall not_be denied eligibility for benefits
fjJ^^l
if Jhe £laimant leaves work undercircumsjances ofjuch^a nature that jt^ s
wou]B„ be ^contrary to eauitv^ and good conscience to i^Ppse_a_dis- <= ^flJfalLu
qualification.
'
-\
ft
J h e commission shajljn cooperation with the„empiQyjBi> Qonsidexior
the purposes^fjhis chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing
attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience.

Quit t o Accompany Spouse.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a claimant who has
left work voluntarily to accompany, follow or join his or her spouse to or in a
new locality does so without good cause for purposes of this subsection.

Discharge for Just Cause.
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to
the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the commission, and
thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least six times
the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment.

Discharge for Dishonesty.
(b) (2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty
constituting a crime or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection
with his work as shown by the facts, together with his admission, or as
shown by his conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction of that crime
and for the 51 next following weeks and for each week thereafter until the
claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and
10

0119

to*-

SCERT1FICATWR0MINENTLY*«
'^

PLEASE SEE INSTRUC

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING

LICENSE
License Number

0007636026
•SSUED TO

Expiration Date
12/31/93

10/28/92

Mortensen, Michael J,
8001 South 1300 West
West Jordan

CLASSIFICATION
CATEGORY

Issue Date

«-rur AIOM. rntSE PERFORATIONS J

UT

84088-

JSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
%
STATE OF
DEPARTMENT 0
License No

RECREATIONAL THERAPIST

0007636026
ISSUED T O

SPECIALIST

M o r t e n s e n

8001 Soutl

SEALED AND ATTESTED

West Jordan
CLASSIFICATION
Ste&iXftfRE OF LICENSE HOLDER

RECREATIONAL,
SPECIALIST
FOR IDENTHrlCATIO

0120

PELLAINTERMOUNTAIN
Windows • Sliding Glass Doors • Wood Folding Doors
8020 SOUTH 1300 WEST • P 0 BOX 548 • WEST JORDAN, UTAH 84084 • (801)566-4131 • FAX (801) 566-5414

March

1, 199C

To Whom

It May

Concern,

Mike is
a l o y a l , h a r d w o r k i n g e m p l o y e e w h o r e s p e c t s authority and
works
well
with othersHe
is
a considerate
and d e p e n d a b l e
person.
We
enjoyed
having
Intermountain.

Mike

as

a member

of

If you h a v e any q u e s t i o n s please feel f r e e
durina b u s iness h o u r s .

our

team

at

to call me at

Pella

566-4131

R o bert Fi c k l i n
A s s i s t a n t Ge ne r a1 M a n ager
Telia Inter m o u n t a i n

BRANCH OFFICES:

655 FIVE MILE ROAD

#44 UNIVERSITY PARKWAY

251 N0RTHW00D WAY

1774 BRIGHAM'S LANDING CENTER

P.O. BOX 2213

BOISE, IDAHO 83704

PR0V0. UTAH 84604

KETCHUM, IDAHO 83340

(208)375-8918

(801)374-2211

(208) 726-0966

FAX (208) 375-8918

FAX (801) 374-2248

FAX (208) 726-1656
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TAH
1839 SOUTH 900 WEST

-

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84104

-

TEL (801) 972-3575

FAX (801) 972-3577

July 6, 1992

To whom it may concern:It is our opportunity to write a letter of recommendation
for Mike Mortensen. Mike has served our company for the last 18
months, of which we have enjoyed his personal service.

Mike is a likable man, gives of his knowledge, time and
resources freely.

He has been a capable office manager, screening

calls, composing letters, using the computer, handling customers
on the phone and at the counter.

Mike, even at times, has helped

out in our shop when called upon. Mike is a giving person.
We wish him well.

Please feel free to call us for further

information.

Sincerely,
UTAH PUMP & MOTOR SUPPLY

KM/sc
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FNniNFFRING

• PUMPS • MOTORS

•

CONTROLS

R562-5a-2.

Good Cause.

1.
Good cause is established if continuance of the
enployment would have had an adverse effect on the claimant
which could not be controlled or prevented and necessitated
immediate severance of the enployment relationship, or if the
work was illegal, or unsuitable new work.
a.

Adverse Effect on the Claimant

The separation must have been motivated by circumstances
which made continuance of the employment a hardship or matter
of real concern sufficiently adverse to a reasonable person
to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. There must
be a showing of actual or potential physical, mental,
ecoromic, personal or professional harm caused or aggravated
by continuance in the enployment. The claimant's reason(s)
for belief of the consequences of remaining on the job must
be real, not imaginary; substantial, not trifling.
These
circumstances must be applied as to the average individual,
not the supersensitive.
b.

Ability to Control or Prevent

Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on
the claimant, good cause is not established if the claimant:
(1) reasonably could have
looking for other enployment, or

continued

working

while

(2) had reasonable alternatives that would have made it
possible for him to preserve his job through approved leave,
transfer, or adjustment to personal circumstances, etc. or,
(3) had not given the etployer notice of the circumstances causing the hardship so the employer would have an
opportunity to make adjustments which would alleviate the
need to quit.
An employee which grievances about his
enployment must show an effort to work out the problems with
the employer unless such efforts would be futile.
c.

Illegal

Good cause is established if the individual was required
to violate State or Federal law or his legal rights were
violated; provided the employer was aware of the violation
and refused to comply with the law.
R562-5a-5.

Evidence and Burden of Proof.

Since the claimant is the moving party in a voluntary
separation, he is the best source of information with regard
to the reasons for the quit. The claimant has the burden of
proof and must show that he had "good cause" for quitting, or
that he meets the requirements for allowance under the equity
and good conscience provision before benefits can be allowed.
0123

